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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Primary  care  has proven  to be  extremely  difﬁcult  to reform  in  Canada  because  of  the  original
social  compact  between  the state  and  physicians  that  led  to the  introduction  of universal
medical  care  insurance  in  the  1960s.  However,  in  the  past decade,  the  provincial  govern-
ment  of  Ontario  has led the way  in  Canada  in  funding  a suite  of primary  care  practice  models,
some of which  differ  substantially  from  traditional  solo  and  group  physician  practices  based
on fee-for-service  payment.  Independent  evaluations  show  some  positive  improvements
in  patient  care.  Nonetheless,  the Ontario  government’s  large  investment  in  the  reform  com-
bined with  high  expectations  concerning  improved  performance  and  the  deteriorating  ﬁscal
position of  the  province’s  ﬁnances  have  led  to  major  conﬂict  with  organized  medicine  over






ring  of  the  system  of primary  care  in the  province.
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1. Medicare and constraints on primary care reform
in Canada
For historical and structural reasons, primary care
has been extremely difﬁcult to reform in Canada. When
universal medical care coverage was introduced in Canada,
for the ﬁrst time in the province of Saskatchewan in 1962,
organized medicine was highly opposed to the policy,
considering it a potential threat to clinical decision-making
and professional autonomy over patient billing. A 23-day
doctors’ strike ensued and was only terminated with a
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org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).compromise known as the Saskatoon Agreement that
protected the status of doctors as independent contractors
paid on fee-for-service (FFS) within the new system. A
corollary of the compact is that, henceforth, doctors would
negotiate for fee increases directly with the provincial
government and would have considerable inﬂuence in
deciding which new health services or procedures should
be included in the basket of universally covered medical
care services. Ensuring the privileged position of physician
services, the Saskatoon Agreement became the template
on which general tax-based universal “medicare” was
introduced in the rest of Canada when the federal gov-
ernment provided some national standards in return for
sharing provincial medical care expenditures [1].For the rest of the twentieth century, primary care was
largely delivered by physicians working in solo practice or
in small physician groups sharing premises and overhead
expenses. The focus was  on basic medical services with
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ew incentives for illness prevention and health promo-
ion. After hours care was variable, limited and sometimes
bsent, forcing patients with minor illnesses into hospital
mergency departments off hours and on weekends. The
estriction of coverage under medicare to physician and
ospital services and FFS physician payment strongly dis-
ouraged the involvement of other health professions in
he delivery of primary care.
By the beginning of the 21st century, the lack of progress
f primary care reform in Canada was obvious to experts
n the ﬁeld as well as decision-makers. Although there
as been renewed interest in reforms over the past 15
ears, these efforts have remained incremental and have
ot resulted in any major system changes in terms of
overnance, in particular, how primary care policy is for-
ulated and implemented and how resources are allocated
o primary care providers and organizations [2,3]. More-
ver, based on patient assessment of selected primary
are indicators and attributes used in the Commonwealth
und’s surveys of international health policy, Canadian
erformance relative to other OECD countries has been
onsistently weak, particularly in timely access to care and
rimary care infrastructure (clinical information systems,
nterprofessional teams, performance measurement and
eedback, and quality improvement support) [4–6].
Canada is a decentralized federation and primary care
olicy is largely within the legislative purview of provincial
overnments, even if some of the conditions for univer-
al coverage are under a federal law known as the Canada
ealth Act [7]. As a consequence, primary care reform
s more usefully evaluated at a provincial rather than a
ational level. Compared to other OECD countries, the
epth of primary care reform has been limited by the con-
traints of the Saskatoon Agreement.
. Background: primary care reform in Ontario
ince 2002
Although still best described as incremental in
pproach, one province – Ontario – stands out in terms of
he provincial government’s single-minded focus on pri-
ary care. The pace of these reforms has been remarkable
nd the content of the reforms have begun to break with
he constraints of the original Saskatoon Agreement. Since
002, the Government of Ontario has launched a number
f primary care models to increase access and improve
he quality and delivery of primary care services. Ontario’s
nvestments in primary care reform were partly enabled by
ederal government funding provided through the Primary
ealth Care Transition Fund (2000–2003) and the Health
eform Fund targeting primary health care, home care and
atastrophic drug coverage in 2003.
The provincial government has relied heavily on
hanges in physician remuneration and the provision of
erformance incentives and bonuses to achieve its aims [8].
etween 2007 and 2009, total payments to primary care
hysicians increased by 32% (compared to a 23% increase in
verall provincial government health care expenditures),
elated mainly to the introduction and spread of the new
eimbursement models [9]. The primary care share of
ealth care expenditures rose from 7.5% to 8.1% during this Policy 120 (2016) 732–738 733
period [9]. Mean payments per full time equivalent primary
care physician (unadjusted for inﬂation) increased by 31%
between 2005 and 2009, compared to an increase of 25%
for all Ontario physicians [10]. An important result of the
introduction of new remuneration models and increased
payments to primary care physicians has been to reverse
the sharp decline in graduating physicians entering pri-
mary care that occurred during the 1990s.
However, relative to the substantial public investment
made, the reforms have not yet produced the level of
improvement in access and quality of care that the provin-
cial government originally expected. As a consequence,
the provincial government agenda is now focused on con-
taining costs while potentially broadening the reforms to
include potential structural changes that could require
more direct accountability of primary care teams to the
provincial government as discussed in the ﬁnal section.
This article reviews the original reforms and the rethink-
ing spurred by mixed assessments of the results, and a
potential major recalibration of the reforms that could have
a substantial impact on primary care reform throughout
Canada.
Prior to 2002, Ontario was almost identical to all
provinces in that primary care was  dominated by FFS doc-
tors in solo and small group practices. The only exception to
this was the proportionately small amount of primary care
delivered by salaried practitioners working in government-
owned but community-governed health centres targeting
poor and marginalized populations. Beginning in 2002, the
Ontario government introduced a number of new models
of care based on three predominant forms of remuneration
– fee-for-service (FFS), capitation and salary as illustrated
in Table 1 [11].
To offset the incentives produced by any one system
of remuneration, the predominant form was  blended with
elements of the other systems. In addition, bonuses and
pay-for-performance targeted ﬁnancial incentives were
offered in all the models in order to encourage certain
desired behaviours, in particular, the provision of after hour
coverage for rostered patients, the provision of targeted
services (e.g. mental health care, palliative care, cancer
screening), and the establishment of key primary care
infrastructure including the implementation of electronic
medical records.
Uptake of the new models by primary care physi-
cians has accelerated during the past decade. In 2002, 94%
of Ontario’s primary care physicians were remunerated
through FFS [11]. By 2015, less than a quarter remained
in traditional FFS and almost half of those FFS physicians
provided specialized services (e.g., palliative care, sports
medicine, hospitalist care, psychotherapy) rather than full-
service primary care.
The capitation- and team-based models have dispro-
portionately attracted physicians serving more afﬂuent,
healthier and lower-cost populations, raising equity con-
cerns [12–14], not surprisingly given the lack of case-mix
adjustment in the age-sex based capitation formula. How-
ever, Rudoler et al. found no evidence that physicians in
capitation-based models are reducing the care they provide
to sick and high cost patients [14]. In addition, although
primary care physician density has increased substantially
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Table 1
Primary care models in Ontario and key reform characteristics, 2002-present.
Sources: Hutchison and Glazier [6], Price et al. [15] and Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (Personal commu-
nication, Richard Glazier, November 18, 2015).
* As of September 1, 2015 (FHG, FHN, FHO, RNPGA), July 2015 (NP-Led Clinic, FHT); Personal communication, Phil
Graham, Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, October 19, 2015.
** Formal registration of patients with a primary care provider.
† These physicians are also included in the numbers for the FHN, FHO and RNPGA remuneration models as only
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n Ontario (and throughout Canada) in the past decade,
ntario’s primary care physician to population ratio (107
er 100,000) remains well below the Canadian average
114 per 100,000) [15].
Of all the models, the Family Health Team was described
s “the provincial government’s ﬂagship initiative in
rimary care renewal” in large part because of the require-
ent to involve other professions beyond doctors and
urses such as social workers, psychologists, dietitians
nd pharmacists [3]. Physicians working in Family Health
eams (FHTs) are remunerated through capitation-based
r salary-based blended payment models. Non-physician
rimary care health professionals working in FHTs (2149
s of December 2015 [Phil Graham, personal communica-
ion, February 25, 2016]) are salaried. The Family Health
eam (FHT) model has proved attractive to a large num-
er of physicians in Ontario [16]. However, due to the high
ost of the model, the popularity of the FHT model has
lso put great ﬁscal pressure on the Ontario government
t the very time it began to question whether it received
dequate value for the investment made, as discussed in
urther depth below.
. Implementation and results
By 2012, Ontario was investing in excess of $1 bil-
ion per year in the new models of primary care, which
nrolled 75% of the Ontario’s population and 75% of pri-
ary care physicians. Included were 200 inter-professional
HTs providing services to 2 million provincial residents
17]. Improvements had been made in terms of expand-
ng access beyond normal working hours, building primary
are infrastructure including electronic medical records,
xpanding the pool of primary care providers, provision of
argeted services that had previously been undersupplied,
nd more integrated and inter-professional primary care
7]. However, provincial decision-makers were becom-
ng increasingly concerned about the growing cost of the
eforms as well as the value for money proposition in terms
f outcomes [18]. In its 2011 annual report, the provin-
ial auditor general concluded that the province had not
eceived value for money for its signiﬁcant new expendi-
ures on primary care doctors [9].
At the same time, there was no performance measure-
ent system linked to the reforms thereby preventing an
ngoing systematic evaluation of outcomes [11]. Instead,
valuations, mainly on particular dimensions, have been
onducted on a piece-meal basis by external actors, includ-
ng academics, and organizations that are arm’s length from
ntario’s Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care [3]. For
xample, the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Anal-
sis at McMaster University evaluated the primary care
ayment incentives in the models. They found that the
ay-for-performance incentives led to an increase (mostly
odest) over baseline levels in the provision of four of ﬁve
reventive services but that the special payments for the
rovision of priority services (e.g., obstetrical deliveries,
alliative care, home visits) above speciﬁed thresholds had
o effect [19].
Evidence regarding the impact of broader aspects of
ntario’s primary care reforms has begun to emerge from Policy 120 (2016) 732–738 735
recent studies. Using longitudinal health administrative
data, investigators from the Institute for Clinical Evalu-
ative Sciences (ICES)observed improvements in cervical
and colorectal cancer screening and diabetes care over the
period 2004/5 to 2011/12 in all organizational and payment
models, with FHTs and the capitation-based models (FHOs
and FHNs) outperforming blended FFS and traditional FFS
on almost every measure [20]. A ﬁve-year evaluation of
FHTs found that organizational structures and processes
associated with high primary care performance were
strengthened between 2009 and 2012, but that patient-
reported outcomes across multiple domains of patient
experience (access, care coordination, patient and family
centredness, prevention and health promotion and support
for management of chronic conditions) were unchanged
[21]. A longtitudinal evaluation of population-based data
(almost 10.7 million patients) found that patients in team-
based capitation practices were more likely to receive
appropriate diabetes care and to be screened for cer-
vical, breast and colorectal cancers in the ﬁnal year of
the study period than those patients in enhanced FFS
(FHG and CCM) models, even after adjustment for patient
and physician characteristics [22]. Over time, patients in
team-based capitation practices showed greater improve-
ment in recommended diabetes care and cervical cancer
screening than patients in non-team capitation practices
and enhanced FFS practices [22].
Comparisons with other provinces (which have
invested less heavily than Ontario in strengthening pri-
mary care) suggest that Ontario’s primary care reforms
may  be starting to bear fruit in terms of access to primary
care services. In a recent poll of Canadian adults, Ontario
respondents were more likely (91% vs. the Canadian
average of 84%) than respondents from other provinces to
report having a “regular family doctor or general practi-
tioner” and more likely than all but one other province to
report that they can get an appointment with their family
doctor/GP “within a day or two” (35% vs. the Canadian
average of 29%) [23]. Ontario respondents were also more
likely than those from other provinces to rate the quality
of medical services as excellent or very good (51% vs. the
Canadian average of 48%). In the 2015 Commonwealth
International Health Policy Survey of Primary Care Physi-
cians in 10 countries, Ontario physicians were more likely
than physicians from other provinces to report being able
to provide same- or next-day appointments to “almost all”
or “most” of their patients and to have an arrangement
where patients can see a doctor or nurse after hours
without going to the hospital emergency department [6].
Despite emerging evidence of progress, the anticipated
results from the reform did not materialize as quickly as
the government would have liked. This fact combined with
the deteriorating ﬁscal position of the province’s ﬁnances
due to the earlier ﬁscal crisis, has led to public sector pay
freezes and difﬁcult negotiations with Ontario doctors.
4. Current issues and developmentsRelations between the provincial government and the
Ontario Medical Association (OMA) have become partic-
ularly acrimonious in the last 12 months. Negotiations
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Table 2
Contrasting System Design for the Reform of Primary Care in Ontario.
28].Sources: Price et al. [25] and Government of Ontario [
reached an impasse following the expiration of the 2012
physician services agreement in April 2014. Eventually, a
conciliator, former chief justice of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, was brought in to help the two parties ﬁnd a
solution. The government then tabled an offer, which was
ultimately rejected by the OMA  at the beginning of 2015
[24]. Since that date, the OMA  and the provincial govern-
ment have continued to wage a very public battle on the
issue of remuneration, the doctors arguing that the gov-
ernment’s cutbacks will negatively affect patient access to
care while the government has argued that it must begin
to reallocate scarce ﬁscal resources to other key areas such
as social care, known in Canada as home care, community
care and long-term care.
The government unilaterally implemented cuts to
physician payments in February 2015 and again in October
2015, totaling approximately 7%. In response to the uni-
lateral actions of the government, the OMA  launched a
court challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in late October, asking the court to strike down
the government’s unilateral actions and to order the gov-
ernment to establish a new negotiations framework that
includes binding dispute resolution (to replace the current
non-binding conciliation process).
The government is also currently considering the report
of the Primary Health Care Expert Advisory Committee,
an expert panel it established in 2013 “to address current
challenges in Ontario’s primary care system”. In particular,
the Expert Advisory Committee was to address four policy
questions [25]:• How can all Ontario residents be rostered?
• How can all residents who  need the services of an inter-
professional primary care team obtain them?
• How can integration among primary care providers and
between primary care providers and other health system
providers and organizations be improved?
• How can residents be ensured that they receive pri-
mary care after business hours and on weekends when
needed?
The Expert Advisory Committee delivered a draft report
to the provincial government in February 2015 [25]. In
addition to suggesting incremental improvements to the
existing primary care models, the Committee recom-
mended radical changes to governance and health system
structure. Drawing on the experience in the National
Health Service in the United Kingdom, the Committee pro-
posed that the entire population of the province and all
primary care providers be assigned to primary care fund-
holding organizations (Patient Care Groups – PCGs) based
on geography.
PCGs would contract with local primary care providers
to deliver primary care services to the PCG’s assigned pop-
ulation. Funds would be transferred to the PCG by the
provincial government based on the socio-economic, geo-
graphic and demographic proﬁle of the population it serves
and then allocated to each provider group according to the
terms of the contract. The PCGs would then be account-
able to regional health authorities, known in Ontario as
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he LHINs to the provincial ministry of health. However,
iven the lack of stakeholder consultation and engagement
o date, the acceptability and feasibility of the model are
ntested.
By holding funds for core primary care services, the
roposed model differs from other examples of local
rimary care governance (e.g., England’s Clinical Commis-
ioning Groups, Australia’s Medicare Locals, New Zealand’s
rimary Health Organizations and British Columbia’s Divi-
ions of Family Practice). In those jurisdictions, payment
or core services is negotiated by the national or, in British
olumbia’s case, the provincial government. In this and
ther respects, the model represents a strong challenge
o medicare’s founding bargain between the medical pro-
ession and the state. The OMA  has already indicated its
pposition to the model on the grounds that the PCG’s
ability to determine physician funding violates the OMA’s
epresentation Rights Agreement as set out in the 2012
hysician Services Agreement” [26]. The OMA  has tabled
n alternative model of primary care governance, which
t calls the Integrated Health Network, that is designed
o achieve horizontal integration of existing primary care
odels at the community level [27].
The provincial government subsequently released a dis-
ussion paper, Patients First: A Proposal to Strengthen
atient-Centred Health Care in Ontario, which proposes
iving LIHNs responsibility for “all health service planning
nd performance” and the identiﬁcation of “sub-regions
ithin LHINs that would be the focal point for local plan-
ing and service planning and delivery” – including, for the
rst time, physicians’ services [28]. “The LIHNs would work
losely with primary care providers to plan services, under-
ake health human resources planning, improve access to
nter-professional teams for those who need it most and
ink patients with primary care services.” The proposal does
ot embrace the concept of local primary care fund-holding
rganizations, as recommended by the Expert Advisory
ommittee, stating that “[t]he ministry would continue
o negotiate physician compensation and primary care
ontracts”. The government has invited stakeholders to
rovide comment on the proposal. Table 2 compares the
ecommendations of the Expert Advisory Committee to the
esponse of the Ontario government as reﬂected in its dis-
ussion paper.
. Conclusion
It remains to be seen how the Ontario government
ill manage its current confrontation with Ontario physi-
ians over primary care reform. If the Ontario government
ccepts and implements either the recommendations of
ts Expert Advisory Committee or the model outlined in
atients First, it will be the ﬁrst province to alter the gov-
rnance of primary care physicians since the introduction
f medicare in the 1960s. Although the Ontario reform
as altered payment mechanisms for primary care doc-
ors more than any other provincial reform, it has not yet
ddressed the fragmentation, lack of voice and lack of col-
ective accountability of primary care at the community
evel.
[ Policy 120 (2016) 732–738 737
Whatever one thinks of the speciﬁc governance mod-
els proposed by the Expert Advisory Committee and the
provincial government, the critical issue of local primary
care governance is squarely on the table and can no longer
be avoided. As the debate and discussion proceed, the great
challenge will be to achieve an appropriate balance at all
levels of bottom-up vs. top-down and incremental vs. “big
bang” transformation, autonomy vs. accountability, sup-
port vs. sanctions, intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation, and
engagement vs. command and control.
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